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From blaming to helping innocent victims, just-world research has revealed that observers 
react to victimization in a variety of ways. Recent research suggests that such responses to 
victimization require effortful thought, whereas other research has shown that people can 
react to these situations intuitively. Along with manipulating just-world threat, across 7 
experiments we manipulated or measured participants’ level of mental processing before 
assessing judgments of victim derogation, blame, willingness to help, and ultimate justice 
reasoning. The effect of just-world threat on these responses held constant over a range of 
manipulations/measures, suggesting that the processes involved in maintaining a belief in a 
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How Much Does Effortful Thinking Underlie Observers’ Reactions to Victimization? 
 
Lerner’s (1980) just world theory posits that people need to believe that the world is a just 
and fair place in which people get what they deserve. Nearly 50 years of research has shown 
that believing in a just world is important enough to people that they will engage in numerous 
strategies to maintain a commitment to deservingness in the face of threat, such as 
compensating an innocent victim or, at times, derogating their character (see Hafer & Bègue, 
2005; Lerner, 1980). For example, in their classic experiment, Lerner and Simmons (1966) 
presented participants with a young woman who was ostensibly receiving electric shocks. 
When given the opportunity, virtually all participants voted to “reward” the victim by freeing 
her from enduring additional electric shocks. However, when there was no such opportunity 
to help and when the participants believed the woman’s suffering would continue into a 
second phase of the experiment, they derogated her character, presumably as a means of 
interpreting her fate as deserved.  
Since this early work, “just world” research has been largely dominated by 
investigations of victim derogation and blame (see Callan & Ellard, 2010; Hafer & Bègue, 
2005), but Lerner (1980) proposed a number of other rational and non-rational strategies 
people can employ to maintain a commitment to justice and deservingness in the face of 
threat (see also Ellard, Harvey, & Callan, in press). Recently, researchers have been turning 
their attention towards investigating these varied responses to undeserved suffering and 
misfortune. For example, among other strategies, observers have been shown to causally 
connect random bad outcomes to unrelated immoral behaviors (i.e., immanent justice 
reasoning; see Callan, Sutton, Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014), perceive benefits in a victim’s later 
life (i.e., ultimate justice reasoning; e.g., Anderson, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2010; Hafer & 
Gosse, 2011; Warner, Vandeursen, & Pope, 2012), compensate victims (e.g., Haynes & 
Olson, 2006), or demonize the perpetrator (see Ellard, Miller, Baumle, & Olson, 2002) to 
perceive justice and deservingness in response to misfortune and innocent suffering. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2010) found that participants whose just-world beliefs were first 
threatened in an unrelated context perceived greater enjoyment and meaning in the later life 
of a victim who suffered a great deal than for a victim who suffered only minimally. That is, 
rather than derogating his character, participants with a heightened concern for justice saw a 
“silver lining” in a misfortune by believing that the victim would be ultimately compensated 
for his suffering. 
Although this research concerning people’s reactions to injustice is broad and 
growing, much less is known about the modes of information processing that underlie these 
reactions. One basic issue concerns the roles that effortful, deliberative thinking and 
effortless, intuitive thinking play in people’s reactions to injustice. That is, do people’s 
responses to victimization require thoughtful deliberation or can they occur quite effortlessly? 
Lerner and colleagues (Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Clayton, 2011; Lerner & Goldberg, 
1999) argued that people’s reactions to injustice occur intuitively and effortlessly, such that 
the recognition of an injustice “automatically elicits more or less elaborately scripted 
preconscious processes that typically include evaluations, thematic organizations of reactions, 
associated affect, and propensities to act” (Lerner & Clayton, 2011, pg. 151). From this 
perspective, initial, schema-based reactions to injustice may lead people to, for example, 
intuitively connect a random bad outcome to the recipient’s prior bad deeds (Callan et al., 
2014), have the impulse to punish perpetrators of harm (Goldberg, J. S. Lerner, & Tetlock, 
1999), or spontaneously help a victim (Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002; Rand, Greene, & 
Nowak, 2012). In support, a growing body of experimental research has suggested that 
people’s reactions to victimization may occur intuitively—that is, without requiring a rational 
mind-set or much effortful thought (e.g., Aguiar, Vala, Correia, & Pereira, 2008; Callan, 
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Ferguson, & Bindemann, 2013; Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010; Goldberg et al., 1999; 
Loseman & van den Bos, 2012; Maas & van den Bos, 2009; van Prooijen & van de Veer, 
2010). For example, adopting an eye-tracking methodology, Callan et al. (2013) found that 
the good (bad) behavior of characters within audio-visual scenes biased participants’ eye 
gaze towards images of good (bad) outcomes before the actual outcomes were revealed 
verbally. This finding highlights how a concern for justice establishes an automatic 
preference for observers to expect outcomes that are consistent with what people deserve. 
van den Bos and Maas (2009), however, argued that people require the mental capacity, 
effort, or ability to carefully consider an episode of injustice and to resolve the logical 
inconsistencies between believing in a just world and knowing that an innocent victim has 
suffered. Because the processes involved in resolving logically inconsistent beliefs are 
inherently propositional (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), resolving an injustice may 
require effortful thought. To test this idea, van den Bos and Maas (2009) induced either an 
experiential/intuitive mind-set or a rational/deliberative mind-set by asking participants to 
consider how they would react to information while thinking intuitively or rationally. 
Participants were then exposed to scenarios that either ended with a high or low just-world 
threat (e.g., a robber who was not apprehended vs. a robber who was punished), and were 
asked to rate the blameworthiness of the victims. Consistent with their hypothesis, 
participants in a rational mind-set blamed the victims more under high than low just-world 
threat, whereas judgments of blame were unaffected by just-world threat when participants 
were in an experiential mind-set. In another experiment, the authors found that self-reported 
belief in a just world positively predicted victim blaming only when participants were in a 
rational (vs. intuitive/experiential) mind-set. These provocative results suggest that (at least) 
blaming an innocent victim requires effortful thought. 
van den Bos and Maas’s (2009) findings seem to stand in contrast to the research 
highlighted above that suggests people’s reactions to injustice can occur without much 
effortful thought. On the whole, however, the research concerning people’s intuitive reactions 
to injustice has largely focused on a variety of different experimental contexts (e.g., 
anticipatory eye-movements within audio-visual scenes; Callan et al., 2013) and responses to 
misfortune (e.g., immanent justice attributions; Callan et al., 2014) than those examined by 
van den Bos and Maas (2009). Thus, we investigated whether effortful thought is necessary 
for people to respond to episodes of injustice in ways more closely aligned with van den Bos 
and Maas’s (2009) approach.  
Overview of the Current Research 
A long history of just-world research has shown that the strategies people employ to 
maintain a commitment to justice occur when people have the mental resources to consider 
their responses (see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). What is not yet clear, however, is the degree to 
which the same effects occur intuitively—that is, when people do not have the ability, time, 
or motivation to think deliberatively about an episode of injustice. Lerner’s (1998; Lerner & 
Goldberg, 1999) theorizing, and the handful of studies reviewed above, suggest that 
individuals recognize, and may react to, injustices intuitively. This idea, however, has not 
been investigated systematically and stands in contrast to research suggesting that reactions 
to injustice require thoughtful deliberation (van den Bos & Maas, 2009). Our aim was to 
address this inconsistency in the literature by determining whether people’s reactions to 
injustice occur effortlessly and/or need thoughtful deliberation.  
Across 7 experiments, we either (a) manipulated effortful thinking directly via time 
pressure or memory load manipulations (e.g., Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Pontari & Schlenker, 
2000; Rand et al., 2012; Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, & De Dreu, in press; Shalvi, Eldar, & 
Bereby-Meyer, 2012; van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006), (b) measured 
individual differences in rational and experiential thinking styles using the Rational-
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Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), or (c) primed intuitive or rational 
thinking (van den Bos & Maas, 2009). Manipulating the time available for participants to 
make their responses is a well-documented way to produce cognitive load, as little time is 
available for people to think rationally, make complex links, or fully utilize controlled 
cognitive resources (e.g., Hernandez & Preston, 2013; Rand et al., 2012). Similarly, placing 
participants under a large memory load restricts people’s capacity to think carefully and 
deliberatively (e.g., Callan et al., 2010; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 
2008; Pontari & Schlenker, 2000). For example, Pontari and Schlenker (2000) demonstrated 
that when people are under memory load (i.e., rehearsing an 8-digit number while performing 
a concurrent task), they are less efficient at the demanding task of presenting themselves as 
an introvert when they are actually an extrovert. Finally, the REI has been shown to predict 
differences in behavior and cognition in regards to experiential and rational thinking styles 
(e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
We then exposed participants to standard just-world threat manipulations that varied 
the innocence of the victim (e.g., Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 
2007; Studies 1-3) or the extent to which the victim suffered (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010; 
Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Studies 4-6) before measuring participants’ reactions to the 
events. van den Bos and Maas (2009) only measured the extent to which participants blamed 
the victim, but as we reviewed above, this is not the only way people can respond to 
perceived injustice. Indeed, Lerner and Simmons’ (1966) findings suggest that when the 
opportunity arises, people will help versus reject an innocent victim, and subsequent research 
building on their findings found that participants typically only resort to derogating the victim 
under certain circumstances, such as when the event was real (vs. fake; Lerner, 1971) or 
occurred in the present (vs. the past; Simons & Piliavin, 1972). More recently, research has 
shown that victim derogation in response to just world threat often occurs only for certain 
individuals (e.g., people with non-oppressive coping styles; Hafer & Gosse, 2011) and in 
certain contexts (e.g., situations where people are focused on their long-term vs. short-term 
goals; Callan, Harvey, & Sutton, 2014; Hafer, 2000a). Thus, although the phenomena of 
rejecting innocent victims has long been associated with just world theory, such responses are 
not necessarily the only means by which people make sense of innocent harm and undeserved 
suffering. Rather than assessing a single response to the victimization scenarios (see Hafer & 
Gosse, 2010, for a critique of the single-response approach), then, for each study we assessed 
the degree to which participants derogated the victim, blamed the victim, were willing to 
help/compensate the victim, and engaged in ultimate justice reasoning (the perception that a 
victim will lead a more fulfilling and meaningful life in the long run; Lerner, 1980).  
 In short, we examined the effects of intuitive versus deliberative processing across a 
variety of victimization scenarios and potential responses to injustice. If people’s reactions to 
victimization require effortful thought, we would expect the effects of just-world threat to be 
weaker or non-existent when participants are mentally busy, under time pressure, have a 
disposition to respond intuitively, or are put into an intuitive mind-set. If, however, people 
respond to episodes of injustice intuitively, we expect the effects of just-world threat to 
remain robust to manipulations and measures of thinking styles. Notably, the latter 
hypothesis entails the prediction that the effects of just-world threat will be largely 
independent of our manipulations and measurement criteria. This kind of invariance is hard 
to establish with conventional significance testing, so we supplement these analyses with a 
Bayesian approach. 
STUDIES 1 TO 3: VICTIM INNOCENCE 
Methods 
Study 1 
Participants. Participants were recruited online (N = 265, 39.2% female, 0.4% 
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unreported; Mage = 29.43 years; SDage = 9.23) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in an online 
survey on impression formation. Participants first read an ostensibly real news report. The 
story described how a young boy sustained an electric shock when he touched a live wire 
while playing with friends around a construction site (Correia et al., 2007). Participants 
learned that the boy needed to have both his arms amputated because of the incident. In the 
innocent victim condition (high just-world threat), participants were given no further 
information about the incident. In the non-innocent victim condition (low just-world threat), 
participants were told that both the boy and his family had been warned about the dangers of 
the construction site.1 
Next, participants answered a series of questions about the vignette with instructions 
to either take as long as they wanted (low time pressure) or to complete the questions within 
70 seconds (high time pressure). The 70-second time limit was determined from pilot work as 
being approximately 1 SD faster than the average natural completion time (cf. Benson & 
Beach, 1996). A countdown timer in a red box was displayed in a fixed location to the right-
hand side of the screen and when 70 seconds elapsed, participants were automatically 
redirected to the next page.  
The questionnaire measured four potential reactions to the scenario: victim 
derogation, ultimate justice, compensation/helping, and victim blame.2 Victim derogation 
was assessed using three items, two of which were adapted from Hafer and Gosse (2011): 
“Overall, my impression of James as a person is:” (1 = positive to 7 = negative), “Overall, 
would you say that you like or dislike James as a person?” (1 = like to 7 = dislike), and a third 
from Payne, Burkley, and Stokes (2008): “Are your feelings towards James cold and 
unfavorable or warm and favorable?” (1 = cold and unfavorable to 7 = warm and favorable; 
reverse coded). 
Ultimate Justice reasoning was assessed using two items adapted from Anderson et al. 
(2010): “To what extent do you think James will find his existence fulfilling later in his life 
as a result of this incident?” (1 = not at all fulfilling to 7 = very fulfilling), and “To what 
extent do you think that in the future, James will experience his life as meaningful because of 
this incident?” (1 = not at all meaningful to 7 = very meaningful). 
Helping judgments were assessed using 4 items. Two items assessed victim 
compensation: “Imagine that you alone had to decide how much money James received in 
compensation for his injuries. By selecting one of the options below, how much money do 
you feel he should receive in compensation?” (1 = $0 to 7 = $30,000+) and “What level of 
monetary compensation do you feel James should receive for what happened to him?” (1 = 
minimal compensation to 7 = maximum compensation). Another two items emphasized 
helping intentions and were adapted from Steins and Weiner (1999): “Let’s imagine James 
needs help with recovery. If you had the possibility to help James, by giving up some of your 
time to aid him in recovery programs, how willing would you be to do so?” (1 = not at all 
willing to 7 = very willing) and “Imagine that in your town there are many opportunities to 
actively help amputees like James by collecting money from different institutions. Would you 
be willing to engage in this kind of help for James?” (1 = not at all willing to 7 = very 
willing). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 All scenarios used in this paper are provided in Appendix 1. 
2 All measures achieved acceptable internal consistency across all studies (αs > .74 or rs > .70). For 
studies that manipulated level of processing (Studies 1-2, 4-5, and 7), the internal consistencies were 
similar across experimental conditions (mean difference between alphas/rs = .00025, range of 
differences was -.25 to +.14). 
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Victim blaming was assessed using four items adapted from van den Bos and Maas 
(2009): “I believe James himself is responsible for what happened to him”, “I believe James 
brought the accident on himself”, “I believe that what has happened to James is his own 
fault”, and “I believe James is to blame for what has happened to him” (1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree).3 
Finally, participants were directed to a new page where they rated how unfair they 
found the incident as a manipulation check, “I feel what happened to James is:” (1 = slightly 
unfair to 7 = a great deal unfair). These same measures were used, in this order4, for all 
studies in this paper, with only slight adaptations to the wording to suit each scenario. 
Study 2 
Participants. Students and staff from the University of Essex participated in a 
laboratory experiment for £3 or partial course credit (N = 146, 68.5% female; Mage = 21.19 
years; SDage = 3.69).  
Materials and Procedure. Participants first completed an unrelated decision-making 
study before completing the material for Study 2. To manipulate cognitive load, participants 
were given up to 20 seconds to either memorize a 2-digit (12; low load) or an 8-digit 
(73749265; high load) number. Participants then read a vignette that described a male 
pedestrian who was struck by a car while crossing the road at a pedestrian crossing (Callan, 
Dawtry, & Olson, 2012). In the innocent victim condition, the driver was identified as being 
on a cell phone and ignoring the traffic signal when the accident occurred. In the non-
innocent victim condition, the pedestrian was reported as being on a cell phone when the 
accident occurred. Two blame items were used for this study: the “responsible” item and the 
“fault” item from Study 1. A third ultimate justice item was included in this study: “To what 
extent do you think John will feel empty 20 years from now?” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree; reverse coded).5  
Study 3 
Participants. Participants from the UK were recruited online via social media 
networks or the University of Essex volunteer e-mail list for the chance to win a gift voucher 
(N = 215, 66.5% female, 0.5% unreported; Mage = 23.23 years; SDage = 7.21). 
Materials and Procedure. We used a short form of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI) scale (24 items) to measure individual differences in both Rationalistic and 
Experiential thinking styles (Norris & Epstein, 2007). The rationality subscale is a modified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Some participants in the time pressure condition were not able to complete all of the questions 
before the time ran out and therefore missed some of the last items in this and our subsequent time 
pressure studies (30%). We therefore used the average of the items participants did answer for their 
scores on these measures. Analyses using only participants who completed every question yielded the 
same main conclusions. We were concerned that because some participants did not answer all items in 
the time pressure conditions, the psychometric properties of these measures may have been affected. 
As a result, we examined the difference between the internal consistencies of our dependent measures 
(i.e., victim blame, derogation, helping/compensation, ultimate justice reasoning) for the studies that 
manipulated time pressure (Studies 1, 4, and 7) using the Feldt test (Feldt, 1969; Suen, 2009) or 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. Out of the 12 comparisons, 5 reached significance. From these 5 
significant comparisons, internal consistencies were higher under time pressure for 4 measures and 
higher under no time pressure for one measure. We therefore conclude that placing participants under 
time pressure did not systematically alter the psychometric properties of our dependent measures. 4	  The	  ordering	  was	  altered	  slightly	  for	  Studies	  2	  and	  7.	  The	  blame	  items	  were	  presented	  after	  the	  victim	  derogation	  items	  for	  Study	  2	  and	  presented	  first	  for	  Study	  7.	  
5 To more closely replicate the measures used by Anderson et al. (2010), the ultimate justice items for 
this study referred to the victim’s life specifically “20 years from now”. As can be seen in Table 1, 
these	  items showed the same pattern of results as those used in Study 1, therefore the items and 
wording from Study 1 (linking a misfortune to future life) was used for the remaining studies.	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form of the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; e.g., “I have a logical mind”) 
and the experiential thinking subscale is based on a Faith in Intuition scale (e.g., “I believe in 
trusting my hunches”), which have been shown to predict intuitive responses (e.g., non-
optimal responses in a gambling task; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Both subscales were 
presented on a 5-point scale (1 = definitely false to 5 = definitely true) and were reliable (αs = 
.83 and .85, respectively).  
Next, participants read a vignette about a young woman who was severely wounded 
when a train caught her leg as it passed. In the innocent victim condition, the woman was 
crossing the tracks when the signals showed it was safe to do so. In the non-innocent victim 
condition, the woman jumped the gates to cross the tracks. Participants then answered the 
questionnaire used in Study 1. A third ultimate justice item was included and used for all 
other studies not using a time pressure manipulation (Studies 5 and 6): “To what extent do 
you think that in the long run, Lucy will find purpose in her life as a result of this incident?” 
(1 = not at all purposeful to 7 = very purposeful; Anderson et al., 2010). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Time Pressure Manipulation. In Study 1, half the participants were placed under 
time pressure. We analyzed the timing data to assess if participants responded more rapidly 
while under a time constraint. Participants in the time pressure condition (M = 57.84, SD = 
12.92) took significantly less time (in seconds) to answer the questionnaire than participants 
in the no time pressure condition (M = 84.36, SD = 42.44), t(262) = 6.87, p < .001, d = .85. 
Participants in the time pressure condition (M = 4.94, SD = 2.43) were also quicker to make 
their first response on the questionnaire than participants in the no time pressure condition (M 
= 7.50, SD = 7.98), t(262) = 3.52, p = .001, d = 0.43. These results confirm that participants 
under time pressure (vs. no time pressure) responded to the questionnaire more rapidly, 
limiting the opportunity to engage in deliberative reasoning (cf. Rand et al., 2012; Shalvi et 
al., 2012). 6, 7 Importantly, these results are consistent with recent research showing that time 
pressure manipulations can be used successfully in online studies employing comparable time 
limits per item/decision (e.g., Hernandez & Preston, 2013; Rand et al., 2012; see also Study 
7). 
  To independently assess whether our time pressure manipulation limits people’s 
capacity for effortful thinking, we conducted a validation study using an online sample of 
participants (N = 79, 73.4% female, 1.3% unreported; Mage = 39.91 years; SDage = 12.08). 
Instead of answering 13 questionnaire items, we asked participants to answer 13 arithmetic 
problems (e.g., 987 + 44) with two multiple-choice answers (e.g., 1041 or 1031; see Gray, 
Schein, & Ward, in press). We also asked participants how challenging they found the 
questions, to what extent they felt they could take their time (reverse coded), and how 
confident they felt in their answers (reverse coded; α = 0.70; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree). Participants were given the same instructions as Study 1 (i.e., to take as 
much time as needed vs. answering the questions as quickly as possible). Participants in the 
time pressure condition were also presented with the same countdown timer, which 
automatically advanced to the next page when 70 seconds had elapsed. 
 As with our time pressure studies (Studies 1, 4, and 7), not all participants in the time 
pressure condition were able to finish answering all the questions (56%). Of the questions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The same time pressure manipulation was used for Studies 4 and 7. Analyses for these data also 
showed that participants in the no time pressure conditions took significantly longer overall (ps < 
.001, ds > 0.85) and were significantly slower to make their first response (ps < .03, ds > 0.34). 
7 In total, two participants from the no time pressure condition were excluded from these analyses for 
being exceptionally slow to make their first response (> 10 SD above the mean). 
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participants did answer, participants under time pressure answered significantly fewer 
questions correctly than participants with no time constraints (see Table 1). Similarly, 
considering the first four questions only, which was the minimum any one person completed, 
participants under time pressure (vs. no time pressure) answered fewer questions correctly. 
Participants also started and finished the problems quicker when under time pressure than 
participants who were not (cf. Studies 1, 4, and 7). In addition, participants in the time 
pressure condition found answering the questions significantly more difficult than 
participants who were not under any time pressure. Finally, only one participant left the study 
from the time pressure condition after starting, indicating no significant difference between 
conditions in terms of termination rates (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .49).8 In sum, the above 
analyses suggest that being placed under time pressure forces people to respond quickly, 
disrupting their ability to respond deliberatively. 
Perceived Unfairness. Across our studies participants in the innocent victim 
condition rated the situations as significantly more unfair than did participants in the non-
innocent victim condition, all ps < .001, ds > 0.52 (see Table 2). 
Cognitive Load X Victim Innocence Interactions 
Our primary analysis strategy was to examine the interaction of Victim Innocence and 
Cognitive Load/REI for our dependent variables across our studies and with all of the data 
standardized and combined into one larger analysis where appropriate (see Table 2). 
Analyses with the cognitive load studies revealed no significant Victim Innocence X 
Cognitive Load interactions. That is, the effect of victim innocence on victim derogation, 
victim helping, and victim blaming did not vary as a function of mental busyness. 
Reinforcing our conclusions further, the significant effect of victim innocence on 
participants’ reactions to the victims were individually significant at both the intuitive and 
deliberative levels of processing (Studies 1 and 2; ps < .01, ds > .65). 
Following Aiken and West (1991), we regressed victim blame, helping, derogation, 
and ultimate justice reasoning onto the manipulation of victim innocence (effect coded), 
rationalistic thinking or experiential thinking (mean-centered), and their cross-product 
interaction terms. The effect of victim innocence was independent of thinking style for all but 
one of the dependent variables (ps > .10). The sole exception was an interaction between 
victim innocence and rationalistic thinking style for ultimate justice reasoning (B = -.68, SE = 
.31), t(209) = 2.16, p = .03. Follow-up analyses showed that participants who were less 
rationalistic (- 1 SD) engaged in more ultimate justice reasoning for the innocent than the 
non-innocent victim (B = .69, SE = .24), t(209) = 2.90, p = .004. Highly rationalistic 
individuals (+ 1 SD) did not differ in their ultimate justice judgments as a function of victim 
innocence (B = -.04, SE = .24), t(209) = 0.15, p > .05. This result suggests that, if anything, 
the less rationalistic participants are, the more they engage in ultimate justice reasoning under 
conditions of just-world threat. See Table 3 for the predicted values of all dependent variables 
as a function of thinking styles. On the whole, the lack of an interaction between victim 
innocence and cognitive load/REI suggests that people’s reactions to innocent victims 
occurred effortlessly as well as rationally. That is, people react to injustice similarly at both 
the intuitive and deliberative level of processing.  
Mediation Analysis 
All dependent measures were significantly correlated with perceived unfairness (data 
collated across studies; see Table 4). Bootstrapping mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008) revealed a significant indirect effect of the victim innocence manipulation on victim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We also found that the sample sizes from our time pressure studies (Studies 1, 4, and 7) were not 
significantly disproportionate, χ2s < .02, ps > .89. Therefore, participants were not more likely to 
terminate the experiment early if placed under time pressure. 
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blame, derogation, helping, and ultimate justice reasoning through perceived unfairness (see 
Table 5). These findings highlight the mediating role of perceived unfairness in people’s 
reactions to the suffering of innocent versus non-innocent victims across levels of mental 
busyness. 
Discussion 
Across 3 experiments, using different victimization scenarios, the innocence of a 
victim influenced victim blaming, derogation, and helping, but these effects were 
independent of manipulations of cognitive load and thinking styles. That is, people 
recognized and responded differently to innocent and non-innocent victims at the intuitive as 
well as the deliberative level of processing. Participants blamed and derogated the innocent 
victim less than the non-innocent victim and instead offered more help and compensation. It 
is, of course, not surprising that participants rated victims who brought about their own 
suffering as less worthy and more blameworthy than those who did not (see Haynes & Olson, 
2006; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).  
Our goal, however, was not to demonstrate that these effects occur, but to directly 
examine how they operate under varying conditions of mental busyness or individual 
differences in thinking styles. van den Bos and Maas (2009) suggested that reactions to 
injustice only occur at the rational/deliberative level of mental processing. From this 
perspective, any effect of a victim’s innocence on people’s responses should be observed 
only when people are able or motivated to think rationally. This does not fit our data. That is, 
the effects of victim innocence were not moderated by factors that directly influence effortful 
thinking—indeed, victim innocence affected victim blaming, victim derogation, and 
judgments of helping regardless of participants’ ability or proclivity to think experientially or 
rationally.  
STUDIES 4 to 6: VICTIM SUFFERING STATUS 
Across Studies 4 to 6, we aimed to confirm that our findings are applicable to another 
just-world threat manipulation: the degree to which a victim suffered (e.g., Anderson et al., 
2010; Callan et al., 2006; Hafer, 2000a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). A second purpose was to 
employ a manipulation that actively encourages deliberative vs. intuitive thinking (van den 
Bos & Maas, 2009).  
Methods 
Study 4 
Participants. Participants were recruited online using MTurk across two time points 
(Ns = 131 and 132; total N = 263, 52.1% female, 0.8% unreported; Mage = 31.81 years; SDage 
= 11.09). These samples did not produce significantly different time pressure by threat 
interactions (ps > .25) and therefore were analyzed together. 
Materials and Procedure. Study 4 mirrored the design of Study 1. First, participants 
read a vignette before answering related questions while under time pressure or not. The 
vignette described a young soccer player who suffered an injury (Anderson et al., 2010). In 
the low suffering condition (low just-world threat), the boy sprained his ankle and although 
this caused an inconvenience and resulted in him missing a soccer game, he soon recovered. 
In the high suffering condition (high just-world threat), the boy badly injured his spine and 
spent much of his teenage years in a wheelchair before recovering. 
Participants then answered the questionnaire (per Study 1) while under time pressure 
(70 seconds) or not. Finally, participants responded to two manipulation check items, which 
were used throughout Studies 4 to 6: perceived unfairness of the accident (see Study 1) and 
the extent to which they believed the victim suffered (“In your opinion, how much do you 
believe James suffered from this incident?”; 1 = hardly suffered at all to 7 = suffered a great 
deal). 
Study 5 
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Participants. Participants were recruited online using MTurk (N = 259, 40.2% 
female; Mage = 30.11 years; SDage = 11.32). 
Materials and Procedure. Study 5 was identical to Study 4, with the exception that 
instead of manipulating time pressure, participants were instructed to respond intuitively or 
rationally (see van den Bos & Maas, 2009) before answering the questionnaire. Half of the 
participants were told to “answer each question as intuitively and impulsively as possible, 
responding using your gut feelings and with the first thing that comes to mind”, whereas the 
other half were told to respond “carefully, weighing the pros and cons” and consider what 
they read in “logical and analytical ways.”  
After completing the questionnaire, participants completed the same 5 manipulation 
check items used by van den Bos and Maas (2009) to assess how intuitively (vs. rationally) 
they responded: “I thought things through thoroughly before reacting to James’s story” (1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; reverse coded), “I weighed and pondered upon my 
answers to the questions about James’s story before reacting” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree; reverse coded), “I reacted intuitively to the questions about James’s story” (1 
= strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), “I reacted impulsively to the questions about 
James’s story by responding with the first thing that came to my mind” (1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree), and  “I answered the questions about James's story more analytically 
and rationalistically OR more intuitively and impulsively” (1 = very analytically and 
rationalistically  to 7 = very intuitively and impulsively; α = .86). 
Study 6 
Participants. Participants were recruited online using MTurk (N = 220, 58.6% 
female; Mage = 33.41 years; SDage = 11.52). 
Materials and Procedure. Participants first completed the rational and experiential 
thinking style subscales of the REI as in Study 3 (αs = .87 and .91, respectively). 
Next, participants read a scenario describing a young woman who contracted a viral 
infection while volunteering at a care home. In the high suffering condition, the victim was 
hospitalized and missed a lot of school. In the low suffering condition, she suffered only mild 
flu-like symptoms and did not miss any school. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Instructions Manipulation. In Study 5, we adapted a procedure from van den Bos 
and Maas (2009) to induce intuitive thinking or rational thinking. A 2 (high vs. low suffering) 
by 2 (intuitive vs. rational instructions) ANOVA confirmed that participants who were given 
instructions to respond intuitively reported responding significantly more intuitively (M = 
4.89, SD = 1.14) than participants who were asked to respond rationally (M = 2.93, SD = 
0.97), F(1, 255) = 222.11, p < .001, d = 1.85. This effect size is equivalent to that reported by 
van den Bos and Maas (2009; average d = 1.89). No other effects on the manipulation check 
index were significant (ps > .25). 
Perceived Unfairness/Suffering. Table 6 shows that the suffering manipulation was 
successful for Studies 4 to 6, with significantly greater perceived unfairness and suffering in 
the high suffering conditions than in the low suffering conditions, ps < .001, ds > 1.26. 
Time Pressure/Mind-sets X Victim Suffering Interactions 
Our primary aim for Studies 4 to 6 was to assess if our manipulations and 
measurement of intuitive/deliberative thinking interacted with the manipulation of victim 
suffering for victim blame, derogation, helping, and ultimate justice reasoning. We tested the 
interactions between time pressure/mind-sets/thinking styles, and suffering status for each 
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dependent measure for each study individually and with all of the data standardized and 
combined into one larger analysis where appropriate (see Table 6).9 
Across Studies 4 to 6, we found that participants blamed the victims less, wanted to 
help/compensate more, and engaged in ultimate justice reasoning more when the victim 
suffered a great deal versus only minimally. There were no significant interactions, with the 
exception of one: victim suffering significantly interacted with time pressure for victim 
helping in Study 4. Decomposing this interaction revealed that the effect of threat on victim 
helping was stronger under high load, t(259) = 9.09, p < .001, d = 1.56, than low load, t(259) 
= 6.10, p < .001, d = 1.09. If anything, this shows that participants were more sensitive to an 
injustice when forced to respond rapidly (cf. Rand et al., 2012). The simple main effects of 
victim suffering on victim reactions from Studies 4 and 5 were significant across levels of 
mental processing. That is, reactions to victimization as a function of victim suffering 
occurred significantly at both the intuitive and deliberative levels of processing (ps < .01, ds 
> .51). Following the same analysis strategy as Study 3 for Study 6, moderated regression 
analyses showed no statistically significant REI X Suffering Status interactions (ps > .22). 
See Table 3 for the predicted values of all the dependent variables as a function of thinking 
styles.  
Mediation Analysis 
All measures significantly correlated with perceived unfairness (see Table 4). 
Bootstrapping analyses revealed a significant indirect effect of the victim suffering 
manipulation on victim blame, derogation, helping, and ultimate justice reasoning through 
perceived unfairness (see Table 5), suggesting that a concern for justice is one mechanism 
that underlies people’s reactions to the suffering of an innocent victim. 
Discussion 
Consistent with recent research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010; Hafer & Gosse, 2011; 
Haynes & Olson, 2006), Studies 4-6 showed that participants opted for more pro-social 
reactions (i.e., victim help/compensation and ultimate justice reasoning) over victim rejection 
when the victim suffered a great deal versus only minimally. Although we did not observe 
the classic effects of victim suffering status on victim derogation and blame (Lerner & Miller, 
1978), as mentioned above, victim derogation in response to just world threat usually occurs 
only under certain circumstances (see Hafer, 2000a; Hafer & Gosse, 2011). More 
importantly, the effects of a victim’s suffering status on participants’ reactions did not vary as 
a function of time pressure, instructions to think intuitively/rationally, or individual thinking 
styles, adding support for the notion that these reactions occur not only at the deliberative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Because we did not conceptually replicate van den Bos and Maas’s (2009) findings using the same 
manipulation of mind-sets, we suspected that the just world threat manipulation they used included 
details that encouraged victim blaming. In an online study (N = 122) we created an “innocentized” 
version of van den Bos and Maas’s (2009) “high threat” scenario and compared it to their original 
high and low threat scenarios in terms of how much participants blamed the victim and how unfair 
and unjust they perceived the situation. In this new version, a young woman cycled home at 2 p.m. 
(vs. 4 a.m. in the original), took her regular route through a park (vs. a shortcut), and was not 
offered—and therefore did not refuse—a ride from her friends. All participants were asked to think 
about and respond to the scenario rationally. Participants in this study blamed the victim less (Ms = 
1.52 and 2.82), and perceived the situation as more unfair/unjust (Ms = 6.51 and 5.71; ps < .01, ds > 
.74), when she was described as more innocent (vs. the original high threat scenario). We did not 
replicate van den Bos and Maas’s effect of low vs. high just-world threat on victim blaming (Ms = 
2.66 vs. 2.82; p = .60, d = .12, JZS Bayes Factor = 5.09), nor was perceived injustice significantly 
different between van den Bos and Maas’s low and high threat scenarios (Ms = 5.49 vs. 5.71; p = .46, 
d = .17, JZS Bayes Factor = 4.46). In sum, these findings support the studies reported above, where 
innocent (vs. non-innocent) victims are blamed less. 
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level of processing, but also when participants are forced or have the tendency to think 
intuitively. Importantly, even though we successfully manipulated deliberative and intuitive 
mind-sets (cf. van den Bos & Maas, 2009), participants responded equally to victims of 
misfortune across both conditions in Study 5.  
STUDY 7: SELF-REPORTED BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD 
Study 7 examined whether mental busyness modulates the positive relation between 
self-reported just-world beliefs and victim blaming (see Furnham, 2003). van den Bos and 
Maas (2009) propose that an inconsistency between one’s self-reported just-world beliefs and 
an observed injustice can only be resolved when people are able to think deliberatively. 
Therefore, the relationship between believing in a just world and victim rejection should be 
significantly weakened when people are less able to think deliberatively. If, however, high 
just-world believers’ reactions to injustice occur intuitively, we would expect the correlations 
between just-world beliefs and reactions to the victim to hold constant regardless of mental 
busyness. To test these ideas, in Study 7 we measured participants’ just-world beliefs before 
presenting them with the suffering of an innocent victim. Participants read the victimization 
scenario and provided their judgments of victim blaming, victim derogation, helping, and 
ultimate justice reasoning while under time pressure or not. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited online using MTurk (N = 159, 56% female, 
1.3% unreported; Mage = 31.66 years; SDage = 10.77).  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were told they would complete two separate 
tasks. First, they were asked to complete the Global Belief in a Just World scale (GBJW; α = 
.90; Lipkus, 1991). Next, all participants were presented with the high suffering scenario used 
in Study 6 (infection at a care home). Finally, as in Studies 1 and 4, judgments of victim 
derogation, blame, helping, and ultimate justice reasoning were assessed while participants 
were under time pressure or not. 
Results and Discussion 
Each of our dependent measures was separately regressed onto the manipulation of time 
pressure (effect coded) and mean-centered GBJW scores, along with their interaction term. 
Consistent with previous research (Furnham, 2003), GBJW was a significant predictor of 
victim blaming (B = .57, SE = .09), t(155) = 6.35, p < .001 (but did not significantly predict 
derogation, helping, or ultimate justice reasoning, ps > .14). See Table 3 for the predicted 
values of all the dependent variables as a function of GBJW. Our manipulation of time 
pressure did not significantly interact with GBJW for our dependent variables (ps > .07), with 
the exception of victim blaming (B = -.48, SE = .18), t(155) = 2.68, p = .008. Figure 1 shows 
that higher GBJW scores were associated with greater victim blaming when there was no 
time pressure (B = .32, SE = .13), t(155) = 2.48, p = .014, but this relation was significantly 
stronger under time pressure (B = .80, SE = .12), t(155) = 6.55, p < .001.  
These results suggest that individuals who are more given to blaming an innocent 
victim (i.e., high just-world believers) do so more strongly when their ability to engage in 
effortful thinking is limited. Rather than indicating that victim blaming occurs only at the 
deliberative level of mental processing (van den Bos & Maas, 2009), Study 7 suggests that 
high just-world believers may be correcting an otherwise intuitive, negative reaction to the 
victim. This finding is consistent with Lerner’s (1998, 2003) suggestion that some people’s 
intuitive, counter-normative responses to an innocent victim’s suffering (e.g., victim 
blaming) may be deliberatively controlled because of other values or concerns (e.g., social 
desirability, adhering to social norms), leading to their heightened expression when cognitive 
resources are not available to monitor responses (see Callan et al., 2010, for similar effects 
with immanent justice attributions for a random negative outcome). 
BAYESIAN ANALYSES 
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We found no interaction between just-world threat and manipulations or measures of 
effortful thinking across 7 highly-powered studies10 employing different manipulations and 
dependent variables. This suggests that mental busyness has little effect on people’s reactions 
to victimization. In other words, our data point to a theoretically meaningful invariance: a 
particular effect is impervious to manipulations that might well be expected to modulate it. 
As Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) have noted, identifying such 
invariance is crucial to scientific progress but is often difficult within the framework of 
conventional statistical testing, where one can reject the null hypothesis but cannot gain 
evidence for it, and where one should “never use the unfortunate phrase ‘accept the null 
hypothesis’” (Wilkinson and the APA Task Force for Statistical Inference, 1999, p. 599). 
Criticisms of this aspect of null hypothesis significance testing have a long history (e.g., 
Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963; Gallistel, 2009; Greenwald, 1975; Wagenmakers, 2007) 
and the situation is elegantly summarized by Bakan (1966): “Even the strict repetition of an 
experiment and not getting significance in the same way does not speak against the results 
already reported in the literature...the study already reported in the literature, with a low p 
value, is regarded as conclusive. Thus we tend to place in the archives studies with a 
relatively high number of Type I errors...and we act in such a fashion as to reduce the 
likelihood of their correction.” 
Partly because of this, there has been increasing interest in Bayesian inference as an 
alternative to conventional null hypothesis significance testing (e.g., Gallistel, 2009; 
Kruschke, 2010; Matthews, 2011; Rouder et al., 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). In particular, 
some researchers have advocated the use of Bayes factors (e.g., Dienes, 2011; Rouder et al., 
2009; Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010; see Kruschke, 2011, for an 
alternative Bayesian approach). The Bayes factor is the probability of obtaining the observed 
data under one hypothesis (or model) relative to the probability of obtaining the data under 
another hypothesis. For example, we may pit the null hypothesis against an alternative 
hypothesis  by calculating the Bayes factor , where 
 is the probability of obtaining the data under hypothesis . The Bayes factor 
provides a continuous measure of evidence; in this example, a Bayes factor of 20 means that 
the data are 20 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative. From 
Bayes’ theorem, the odds of the two hypotheses given the data, , are 
equal to the prior odds (i.e., the odds before the current data were collected) multiplied by the 
Bayes factor. In other words, the Bayes factor quantifies how we should update our beliefs in 
light of the data, and is therefore argued to be an obvious basis for inference.  
To calculate the Bayes factor, one must specify an alternative hypothesis . 
Typically, researchers entertain a distribution of possible alternatives to the null, some of 
which are judged more likely than others. For example, we may anticipate a high probability 
of a small-to-medium effect, a moderate probability of a large effect, and a very remote 
chance of a gargantuan effect. More generally, a given hypothesis will entail a set of 
parameters, and in advance of data collection different parameter values are assigned 
different prior probabilities. Calculation of the Bayes factor involves weighting the 
likelihood of obtaining the data with a given parameter value by the prior probability of that 
parameter value, across the whole of the parameter space. The prior distribution therefore 
influences the Bayes factor, and the choice of a prior distribution is at the researcher’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We conducted sensitivity power analyses for the collated data from Studies 1-2 and for 4-5. For 
studies 1-2 the sensitivity analysis suggests 95% power to detect an effect with f = 0.18 ( = .031); 
for studies 4-5 there is 95% power to detect an effect with f = 0.16 ( = .025). 
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disposal; it may be based on knowledge about likely values established in previous work, or 
it may be chosen to be minimally informative (e.g., by letting every parameter value be 
equally likely). Considerable effort has been spent developing “default” priors which are 
broadly applicable, computationally tractable, and have desirable properties; there are now 
“Bayesian versions” of several familiar analyses, including t-tests (e.g., Rouder et al., 2009; 
Wetzels, Raaijmakers, Jakab, & Wagenmakers, 2009), correlation (e.g., Wetzels & 
Wagenmakers, 2012), regression (Rouder & Morey, 2012), and ANOVA (Rouder, Morey, 
Speckman, & Province, 2012; Wetzels, Grasman, & Wagenmakers, 2012). 
We calculated Bayes factors to examine the interaction effects in our studies, using 
two different default priors developed for variable selection in the linear model framework. 
Our primary focus is on the Bayes factor calculated using a Zellner-Siow (ZS) g prior 
(Zellner & Siow, 1980). This is a widely-used prior with a number of desirable mathematical 
properties, which can be rendered in a computationally convenient form to serve as a default 
for many analyses based on linear models (Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde, & Berger, 2008; 
Wetzels et al., 2012; see Appendix 2 for more details).  
 Table 7 shows the Bayes factors for the interactions between cognitive load and 
victim innocence/suffering in the studies which factorially manipulated these variables 
(Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5), for the interactions between victim innocence/suffering and both the 
rational and experiential components of the REI (Studies 3 and 6), and for the interaction 
between time pressure and GBJW (Study 7). Of the 36 Bayes factors, 34 are greater than 1.0, 
meaning that they favor the null hypothesis of no interaction effect. Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, and van der Maas (2011) proposed a verbal classification scheme for Bayes 
factors (Table 8). Applying this to our results, 4 of the Bayes factors provide “anecdotal” 
evidence for the absence of an interaction, 27 provide “substantial” evidence and 3 
demonstrate “strong” evidence. Of the two Bayes factors less than 1.0, one has a value of 
0.95, indicating that the data are almost completely uninformative with respect to the two 
hypotheses, and the other (for the victim blaming measure of Study 7) has a value of 0.28, 
suggesting “substantial” evidence for the presence of an interaction. This is the same time 
pressure x GBJW interaction discussed above. Repeating the analysis using a “unit 
information prior” for the alternative hypothesis yielded almost identical results (Table 7).  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across 7 experiments we assessed people’s reactions to injustice at varying levels of mental 
processing and thinking styles. Studies 1 to 3 found that the effects of victim innocence on 
victim rejection and willingness to help were largely independent of manipulations of mental 
busyness and individual differences in thinking style. Studies 4 to 7 further demonstrated the 
effortlessness of people’s reactions to victimization with a manipulation of intuitive/rational 
mind-sets, the measurement of just-world beliefs, and a different just-world threat 
manipulation (victim suffering status). On the whole, these results point to the conclusion that 
rational and effortful thought is not required for people to respond to victimization. In fact, 
the few significant interactions we did observe were in the opposite direction from what 
might be expected if effortful thinking was necessary. 
If effortful thinking is not necessary, then what processes underlie people’s reactions 
to victimization? Drawing on recent single-process accounts of judgments (see Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011), we argue that both intuitive and deliberative reactions to injustice are 
based on the application of the same justice-related heuristics or scripts elicited by the most 
salient cues within the environment (see Lerner, 2003; Lerner & Clayton, 2011). That is, 
people’s reactions to injustice will be determined by the application of the same heuristics 
regardless of whether they have the time, motivation, or ability to engage in effortful 
thinking. Such justice-related heuristics, which Lerner (1998) argued appear very early in 
people’s lives, may reflect notions such as “blameworthy people are bad people” (Haynes & 
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Olson, 2006) or “if a victim suffers a lot, then help/compensate” (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). 
Echoing Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s (2011) sentiments about the “rule selection problem,” 
the challenge for future research will be to determine “what these heuristics are, when they 
are applied, and in which situations they are successful” (pg. 101). In addition, although 
applying these heuristics may not require effortful deliberation, actually implementing them 
may do. That is, helping and compensating a victim may be more effortful to actually 
implement than, for example, avoiding a victim. Another potential avenue for future research, 
then, is to examine the role that effortful versus intuitive thinking might play in the 
implementation of actions associated with people’s initial responses to victimization.  
In light of our results, then, why did van den Bos and Maas (2009) find that participants 
engaged in victim blaming only when in a deliberative/rational mind-set? One possible 
reason is that van den Bos and Maas (2009) used a victimization scenario containing details 
that insinuated that the victim was in some way acting irresponsibly and was worthy of blame 
(i.e., a non-innocent victim; see footnote 8). Offering participants cues to blame the victim 
may therefore result in victim blaming becoming the most accessible and utilized response, 
depending on the manipulated mind-set of participants (see Hafer & Gosse, 2010; Haynes & 
Olson, 2006). Moreover, van den Bos and Maas (2009) only examined the extent to which 
their participants blamed the victims under different “primed” mind-sets, which limited the 
degree to which generalizations could be made to other potential reactions to perceived 
injustice and other instantiations of mental busyness. Our 7 studies used multiple scenarios 
over two variations of just world threat before assessing four potential reactions to the 
victimization scenarios. The present research therefore provides a more comprehensive 
account of the role that intuitive versus effortful thinking plays in people’s responses to 
victimization.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are, of course, limitations to the current research. First, our time pressure 
manipulation resulted in several participants not finishing the questionnaire within the time 
limit. As such, the measures nearer the end of the questionnaires may have been less reliably 
assessed. Researchers interested in using time pressure manipulations to examine intuitive 
versus effortful responses to victimization might consider randomizing items across scales, 
calibrating time limits to individual participants’ known rates of responding, or relying on 
other manipulations of intuitive versus effortful thinking (e.g., memory load). 
Second, although we examined a number of justice-restoring strategies, this is by no 
means an exhaustive account of all the possible means by which people maintain a 
commitment to justice. For example, psychologically distancing oneself from a victim 
(Hafer, 2000b; Lerner, 1980) or demonizing a perpetrator (Ellard et al., 2002) have been 
considered means to restoring a belief in a just world. Future research should consider a 
range of different strategies to further assess the effortlessness of people’s varied reactions to 
injustice. As highlighted in the current research, it is important to measure a range of 
different reactions to injustice because people’s first “port of call” to restore justice to the 
situation may not necessarily involve victim rejection. Indeed, the phenomenon of rejecting 
innocent victims has long been associated with just world theory and has dominated much of 
the research literature (see Callan & Ellard, 2010; Hafer & Bègue, 2005), but a growing body 
of research has shown that when given the opportunity, people opt to help innocent victims 
over derogating them (cf. Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Furthermore, victim rejection is often 
only found in certain circumstances (e.g., when people are focused on their long-term goal; 
see Hafer, 2000a) or as a function of various individual differences (e.g., for people with non-
oppressive coping styles; Hafer & Gosse, 2011; or people higher in a self-reported belief in a 
just world; see Study 7). Victim rejection may also occur only when participants are 
motivationally and emotionally engaged by a victimization context (see Lerner, 2003), which 
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might have been limited in the sorts of scenarios and vignettes we used in the current 
research. 
Finally, individual differences and the situational determinants of what strategies 
people employ to maintain a belief in a just world were largely not considered in the present 
investigation. Hafer and Gosse (2010) suggest that strategy choice and magnitude may vary 
as a function of ideological beliefs, justice beliefs, demographics, and coping styles. For 
example, Hafer and Gosse (2011) identified that individuals identified as “repressors” 
positively appraised an innocent victim’s suffering as a means of maintaining their belief in a 
just world, whereas “non-repressors” devalued the victim’s character. Harvey and Callan 
(2014) found that the more (vs. less) religious people were, the more they causally connected 
a victim’s prior misdeeds to his current misfortune as a way of making sense of the 
misfortune. Therefore, future research should investigate whether individual differences and 
different contexts might modulate the different strategies people employ to maintain a belief 
in a just world under varying levels of mental processing. 
Conclusions 
We found that, overall, people respond to just-world threat in ways that remain robust 
to manipulations or measurements of deliberative and intuitive processing, showing that 
people respond to victimization not only when they are able to think rationally or 
deliberatively, but also when responding quickly, under memory load, or thinking intuitively.  
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Innocence F (d) 
[95% CI] 
Load F (d) 
[95% CI] 
I X L 
F 
Study 1 (time pressure); N = 265        
VD 2.86 (1.29) 2.69 (1.20) 3.64 (1.23) 3.46 (1.24) 24.79 *** (.60) 1.31  (0.06) <0.01 
UJ 3.69 (1.37) 3.74 (1.36) 3.47 (1.35) 3.66 (1.33) 0.74 (0.10) 0.51  (0.07) 0.17 
Helping 5.18 (1.43) 5.29 (1.23) 3.64 (1.59) 3.78 (1.69) 66.93 *** (1.01) 0.40  (0.04) <0.01 
Blame 3.12 (1.71) 2.92 (1.48) 4.90 (1.56) 4.74 (1.79) 72.90 *** (1.08) 0.72  (-0.01) <0.01 
Unfair 5.16a (1.87) 4.18a (1.87) 18.09 *** (.52) - - 
Study 2 (memory load); N = 146        
VD 3.34 (0.95) 3.39 (0.90) 4.17 (0.71) 4.08 (0.57) 31.34 *** (0.96) 0.02  (0.19) 0.22 
UJ 4.37 (1.02) 4.62 (.89) 4.43 (0.93) 4.46 (1.04) 0.09 (0.07) 0.76  (0.16) 0.50 
Helping 4.52 (1.10) 4.29 (1.05) 3.73 (1.29) 3.55 (1.04) 15.67 *** (0.64) 1.12  (0.05) 0.01 
Blame 2.98 (1.42) 2.79 (1.46) 4.42 (1.24) 4.91 (1.01) 64.37 *** (1.32) 0.45  (0.13) 2.38 
Unfair 4.73a (1.69) 3.60a (1.30) 20.55 *** (0.75) - - 
Study 3 (REI); N = 215       
VD 3.55a (1.08) 4.61a (1.11) 50.17 ** (0.97) - - 
UJ 4.26a (1.19) 3.92a (1.28) 3.82  (0.27) - - 
Helping 4.78a (1.38) 2.96a (1.29) 99.54 *** (1.37) - - 
Blame 2.97a (1.65) 5.47a (1.27) 154.40 *** (1.70) - - 
Unfair 5.21a (1.69) 3.45a (1.86) 51.48 *** (0.99) - - 
Studies 1-3; N = 626 (see note)        
VD -.29 (1.02) -.38 (0.96) .42 (0.89) .27 (0.88) 100.88 *** (0.80) 
[.64, .97] 
1.16  (0.11) 
  [-.09, .30] 
0.11 
UJ -.01 (1.03) .10 (0.97) -.09 (0.99) .003 (1.01) 3.48 (0.15) 
[-.01, .31] 
1.13  (0.11) 
  [-.09, .30] 
0.01 
Helping .42 (0.87) .37 (0.81) -.39 (1.02) -.42 (0.97) 163.38 *** (1.03) 
[.86, 1.19] 
0.21  (0.05) 
  [-.15, .24] 
0.01 
Blame -.45 (0.90) -.56 (0.85) .48 (0.81) .52 (0.89) 271.53 *** (1.34) 
[1.16, 1.51] 
0.17  (0.04) 
  [-.16, .24] 
0.79 




Note. VD = Victim Derogation; UJ = Ultimate Justice; I = Innocent; NI = Non-innocent; HL = High load; LL = 
Low load; d  = Cohen’s d; 95% CI = 95% Confidence Intervals around d. Effect sizes coded as negative if group 
differences are inconsistent with direction from the combined analysis. For the combined data set, data was 
standardized and combined before separate ANOVAs were run for each main effect and interaction. The REI 
data is therefore only represented for the main effect of innocence, but not for the main effect of cognitive load 
or the interaction.  
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001  a = Innocence level means 
 
  




Predicted values for victim derogation, ultimate justice reasoning (UJ), victim helping, victim 
blame as a function of rationalistic and experiential thinking style for Studies 3 and 6 (upper 
section) and as a function of global belief in a just world (GBJW) for Study 7 (lower section). 
 
 Rationalistic Experiential 
 - 1 SD + 1 SD - 1 SD + 1 SD 
Study 3: 
Victim Innocence; N = 215 
    
Derogation     
Innocent victim 3.43 3.68 3.66 3.48 
Non-innocent victim 4.61 4.62 4.64 4.57 
UJ     
Innocent victim 4.50 3.99 4.01 4.43 
Non-innocent victim 3.81 4.03 3.89 3.97 
Helping     
Innocent victim 4.70 4.87 4.59 4.92 
Non-innocent victim 2.97 2.96 3.04 2.85 
Blame     
Innocent victim 2.85 3.10 3.03 2.93 
Non-innocent victim 5.21 5.71 5.23 5.80 
Study 6: 
Victim Suffering; N = 220 
    
Derogation     
High suffering 2.21 1.96 2.31 1.83 
Low suffering 2.18 2.27 2.43 2.06 
UJ     
High suffering 4.88 5.22 4.75 5.41 
Low suffering 4.30 4.31 4.17 4.41 
Helping     
High suffering 3.92 3.66 3.65 3.98 
Low suffering 2.94 2.60 2.72 2.80 
Blame     
High suffering 2.77 2.42 2.74 2.43 
Low suffering 3.23 3.17 3.11 3.28 
     
 GBJW   
 - 1 SD + 1 SD   
Study 7: 
Victim Suffering; N = 159 
    
Derogation     
Time pressure 1.68 2.18   
No time pressure 2.00 1.92   
UJ     
Time pressure 5.15 5.26   
No time pressure 4.90 5.39   
Helping     
Time pressure 4.04 3.84   
No time pressure 3.63 4.18   
Blame     
Time pressure 1.59 3.09   
No time pressure 1.90 2.51   
 
 




Correlations among the relevant standardized and combined measures for Studies 1-3 (above 
the diagonal) and Studies 4-6 (below the diagonal). 
 
 Derogation UJ Helping Blame Unfairness 
Derogation - -.26 -.52 .59 -.46 
UJ -.43 - .16 -.17 .13 
Helping -.25 .45 - -.63 -.49 
Blame .38 -.22 -.28 - -.57 
Unfair -.12 .35 .56 -.25 - 
Suffer -.21 .46 .59 -.25 .72 
 
Note. All correlations are significant at p < .01. 
  




Bootstrapped indirect effects of the just-world threat manipulations on victim derogation, 
ultimate justice reasoning, victim helping, and victim blame through perceived unfairness.  
 
   95% BCA 
Confidence Interval 
 Point Estimate SE LL UL 
Study 1-3 (victim innocence)    
Victim Derogation -.26 .04 -.35 -.18 
Ultimate Justice .08 .03 .02 .15 
Victim Helping .26 .04 .19 .34 
Victim Blame -.29 .04 -.37 -.21 
Study 4-6 (victim suffering status)    
Victim Derogation -.14 .06 -.25 -.03 
Ultimate Justice .24 .06 .14 .35 
Victim Helping .51 .05 .41 .61 
Victim Blame -.24 .06 -.36 -.13 
 
Note. BCA = Bias-corrected and accelerated. SE = Standard error. LL = Lower limit. UL = Upper 
limit. Ten thousand bootstrapped resamples were used for each test.  
 
  














Suffering F (d) 
[95% CI] 
Load F (d) 
[95% CI] 
S X L 
F 
 
Study 4 (time pressure); N = 263             
VD 2.36  (1.23) 2.38 (1.05) 2.71 (1.08) 2.39 (1.02) 1.75  (0.17) 1.27  (0.14) 1.61  
UJ 5.48 (1.25) 5.49 (1.23) 4.30 (1.36) 4.57 (1.22) 45.10 *** (0.83) 0.76  (0.11) 0.75  
Helping 4.72 (1.53) 4.37  (1.46) 2.49 (1.33) 2.86 (1.30) 115.39 *** (1.32) 0.01  (0.03) 4.38 * 
Blame 2.57 (1.52) 2.48 (1.27) 2.90 (1.62) 2.79 (1.36) 3.01 (0.22) 0.30  (0.07) 0.01  
Unfair 4.96a (1.51) 2.73a (1.54) 141.02 *** (1.46) - -  
Suffer 6.02a  (1.14) 2.82a (1.50) 380.77 *** (2.41) - -  
Study 5 (mind-set instructions); N = 259          
VD 2.50 (1.04) 2.35 (1.03) 2.68 (1.28) 2.64 (1.15) 2.77 (0.21) 0.46  (0.08) 0.12  
UJ 5.32 (1.13) 5.55 (0.95) 4.26 (1.46) 4.33 (1.44) 52.81 *** (0.90) 0.98  (0.10) 0.24  
Helping 4.16 (1.55) 4.57 (1.48) 2.71 (1.13) 2.75 (1.14) 95.92 *** (1.22) 1.81  (0.12) 1.19  
Blame 2.28 (0.93) 2.10 (1.31) 2.87 (1.35) 2.96 (1.36) 22.00 *** (0.58) 0.08  (0.02) 0.74  
Unfair 5.43 (1.43) 5.42 (1.40) 2.97 (1.37) 2.74 (1.64) 198.39 *** (1.76) 0.44  (0.08) 0.33  
Suffer 6.29 (0.84) 6.09 (1.08) 3.13 (1.31) 2.98 (1.73) 384.59 *** (2.44) 1.12  (0.11) 0.02  
Study 6 (REI); N = 220           
VD 2.09a (1.03) 2.23a (1.14) 0.81 (0.12) - -  
UJ 5.04a (1.21) 4.30a (1.45) 16.72 *** (0.55) - -  
Helping 3.80a (1.35) 2.76a (1.22) 35.66 *** (0.80) - -  
Blame 2.60a (1.42) 3.20a (1.45) 9.56 ** (0.42) - -  
Unfair 4.72a (1.59) 2.74a (1.55) 87.71 *** (1.26) - -  
Suffer 5.40a (1.27) 2.32a (1.32) 310.14 *** (2.38) - -  
Studies 4-6; N = 742 (see note)        
VD -.06 (1.02) -.12 (0.93) .18 (1.05) .01 (0.98) 5.20 * (0.17) 
[.02, .31] 
1.63  (0.11) 
  [-.06, .28] 
0.44 
UJ .35 (0.86) .44 (0.80) -.47 (1.02) -.34 (0.97) 109.99 *** (0.77) 
[.62, .92] 
1.50  (0.11) 
  [-.06, .28] 
0.07 
Helping .52 (0.95) .54 (0.91) -.60 (0.75) -.48 (0.74) 231.95 *** (1.12) 
[.96, 1.27] 
0.75  (0.08) 
  [-10, .25] 
0.47 
Blame -.15 (0.89) -.24 (0.95) .20 (1.08) .20 (1.00) 30.31 *** (0.41) 
[.26, .56] 
0.27  (0.05) 
  [-.13, .22] 
0.23 
Unfair .60a (0.79) -.60a (0.81) 415.29 *** (1.50) 
[1.33, 1.66] 
- - 





Note. VD = Victim Derogation; UJ = Ultimate Justice; HS = High suffering; LS = Low suffering; HL = High 
load/rational mind-set; LL = Low load/intuitive mind-set; d  = Cohen’s d. For the combined data set, data was 
standardized and combined before separate ANOVAs were run for each main effect and interaction. The REI 
data is therefore only represented for the main effect of suffering, but not for the main effect of cognitive load or 
the interaction.  
 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 a = Suffering level means 
  




Bayes factors with the ZJS prior and the unit information prior for the Just-World Threat X 
























Study 1-3 (victim 
innocence)     
    
Study 1 11.89 10.76 11.42 9.50 15.75 16.30 16.18 14.98 
Study 2 2.84 7.62 8.05 6.05 3.68 10.85 12.04 9.42 
Study 3 EXP 3.23 9.63 4.26 5.96 3.85 13.72 5.54 9.24 
Study 3 RAT 9.98 7.39 9.86 0.95 12.01 10.48 12.93 1.44 
 
Study 4-7 (victim 
suffering status)         
Study 4 9.93 4.64 1.41 7.64 15.59 7.23 1.83 11.13 
Study 5 7.35 9.65 6.60 9.87 11.13 15.16 8.89 14.23 
Study 6 EXP 7.30 4.98 9.90 6.39 11.23 7.77 14.46 9.68 
Study 6 RAT 4.56 8.88 8.01 5.07 6.98 13.73 11.71 7.55 
Study 7 0.28 1.80 1.71 5.18 0.37 2.75 2.62 8.02 
         
Studies 1-2 
collated 9.75 12.90 13.79 12.90 13.36 19.25 20.11 20.20 
 
Studies 4-5 
collated 12.83 11.65 13.46 15.11 19.96 18.37 18.08 22.02 
 
  








Bayes factor, BF01 Interpretation 
>100 Extreme evidence for H0 
30-100 Very strong evidence for H0 
10-30 Strong evidence for H0 
3-10 Substantial evidence for H0 
1-3 Anecdotal evidence for H0 
1 No evidence 
1/3-1 Anecdotal evidence for H1 
1/10-1/3 Substantial evidence for H1 
1/30-1/10 Strong evidence for H1 
1/100-1/30 Very strong evidence for H1 














Figure 1. Relation between global belief in a just world (GBJW) (Mean +/- 1 SD) and victim 
blaming as a function of time pressure. 
  
  





The scenarios used for each study. 
 
 Innocent Non-innocent 
Study 1 In a tragic incident, the fun of innocent child’s 
play turned into sorrow when an eight-year-old 
boy lost both his arms in a lethal electric shock. 
 
The incident happened shortly before 3pm 
Sunday afternoon when young James Wilson 
was playing ball with a few friends near his 
family home. 
 
The ball went astray into a nearby house under 
construction and unfortunately this house was 
not sufficiently protected. James went to collect 
the ball and sustained his injuries when he 
grabbed hold of an exposed cable for support, 
causing an intense electric current to surge 
through his body. 
  
As a consequence, James lost function in both 
his arms and medical staff had no choice but to 
amputate them. Due to this life-changing event, 
James can no longer carry out everyday 
activities without assistance, such as opening 
doors and eating or drinking. 
 
Same as innocent with the addition of: 
Sources have revealed that James and his family 
had already been informed of the danger the 
house posed. The house in question also 
displayed a clearly visible ‘DANGER’ warning 
sign and James’s friends report telling him not to 
enter the house. Sadly, James did not take note 
of these warnings. 
Study 2 A young man was hospitalised this morning 
after being struck by a Ford Fiesta as he used the 
pedestrian crossing on Dunmow High Street. 
John Banford, 22, was taken by ambulance to 
Broomfield Hospital in Chelmsford suffering 
from serious concussion. The accident is still 
under investigation, but one witness indicated 
that the driver of the Ford Fiesta was using a 
mobile phone at the time of the accident. 
A young man was hospitalised this morning 
after being struck by a Ford Fiesta as he used the 
pedestrian crossing on Dunmow High Street. 
John Banford, 22, was taken by ambulance to 
Broomfield Hospital in Chelmsford suffering 
from serious concussion. The accident is still 
under investigation, but one witness indicated 
that John Banford did not observe the stop sign 
at the crossing and was using a mobile phone at 
the time of the accident. 
 
Study 3 Young woman suffers major injuries after 
incident with train.  
At 16:35 GMT, Lucy Taylor, 18, was hit by an 
oncoming train, while crossing a railway line 
close to her home. 
“The barriers were up, the signals weren’t on 
and we could hear nothing coming, so it looked 
clear to go”, stated Kate Walsh, who was with 
Ms. Taylor at the time. Ms. Taylor was the first 
Young, drunk woman suffers major injuries after 
incident with train.  
At 16:35 GMT, Lucy Taylor, 18, was hit by an 
oncoming train, while crossing a railway line 
close to her home. 
“The barriers were down and the signals were 
on. The girls were messing around by the 
barriers and were obviously intoxicated…one 
girl thought it would be a good idea to jump the 
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to cross, just as a train was rapidly approaching 
from a sharp bend to the left. As the train 
passed, it caught Ms. Taylor’s left leg and her 
face was badly wounded as she fell.  
Ms. Taylor was rushed to hospital via an air 
ambulance, where they were unable to save the 
sight in one eye but successfully amputated her 
left leg at the knee. 
 
barrier and run across the tracks before the 
train”, stated Kate Walsh, one onlooker present 
at the time. Ms. Taylor attempted to cross, just 
as a train was rapidly approaching from a sharp 
bend to the left. As the train passed, it caught 
Ms. Taylor’s left leg and her face was badly 
wounded as she fell. 
Ms. Taylor was rushed to hospital via an air 
ambulance, where they were unable to save the 
sight in one eye but successfully amputated her 
leg at the knee. 
 
 High Suffering Low Suffering 
Studies 
4 & 5 
James_249: I had a relatively normal childhood. 
I played soccer from a young age and went to a 
suburban elementary school, where I had a 
number of close friends. 
  
At the age of fifteen, I was playing for an 
amateur soccer league, run by the American 
Soccer Association (ASA), when an accident on 
the field brought my own teammate’s cleat down 
on the back of my calf. My leg was severely 
broken and the fall also caused damage to my 
spine. My soccer career was finished, and over 
the next several years, I underwent dozens of 
surgeries to correct the damage to my leg and 
spine, and was confined to a wheelchair for 
much of my teenage years. I was unable to 
attend high school with the rest of my peers and 
had few friends. At the age of eighteen, I finally 
received treatment that allowed me to walk 
again and I was able to leave my wheelchair 
behind when I went off to university. 
 
James_249: I had a relatively normal childhood. 
I played soccer from a young age and went to a 
suburban elementary school, where I had a 
number of close friends. 
  
At the age of fifteen, I was playing for an 
amateur soccer league, run by the American 
Soccer Association (ASA), when an accident on 
the field brought my own teammate’s cleat down 
on the back of my calf. I suffered a mild sprain 
to my ankle that caused me to miss the next 
game, which happened to be the cup final. The 
sprained ankle also prevented me from walking 
to school, which was a mild inconvenience for a 
short period. However, I made a full, natural 
recovery soon after the incident and enjoyed the 
rest of my teenage years with my friends. I 
continued playing for the soccer team for 3 years 
until the age of eighteen, when I went off to 
university. 
Studies 
6 & 7 
Jenny_249: I have always wanted to be a nurse. 
When I was 17, I worked at the local care home 
for the elderly. I really enjoyed my time there, 
although it wasn’t without its difficulties.  
About 4 months into the job I caught a nasty 
viral infection from one of the new patients. At 
first I just thought I had a headache, but my 
symptoms grew worse and worse. I couldn’t 
keep any food or liquids down and suffered from 
severe dehydration, which resulted in me being 
hospitalized. I was put on a drip and had to stay 
under observation for several weeks, while I 
built my strength back up. Unfortunately, I 
missed a lot of high school while I was 
recovering and struggled to catch up when I 
returned. The next couple years at high school 
Jenny_249: I have always wanted to be a nurse. 
When I was 17, I worked at a local care home 
for the elderly. I really enjoyed my time there, 
although it wasn’t without its difficulties.  
About 4 months into the job I caught an 
infection from one of the new patients. At first I 
had a headache, and then I felt like I had a mild 
cold. I felt a bit under the weather for a day or 
so, but I still attended high school as usual. I 
recovered quickly and was back to full strength 
in no time at all. I carried on the next couple of 
years at high school as usual. I kept on top of my 
workload and had plenty of time to socialize. 
Now at age 20, I am in my first year of an adult 
nursing degree. 
Reactions to Victimization               	  
	  
33
were hard work; keeping on top of my workload 
left little time for socializing. Now at age 20, I 
have fully recovered and I am in my first year of 











Here we briefly summarize the calculation of the Bayes factors reported in Table 7 of 
the main text. This summary closely follows Liang et al. (2008), who offer a much more 
detailed discussion (for other introductions to this area, see Wetzels et al., 2012; Rouder & 
Morey, 2012.) 
For a given analysis, we have a set of n responses. We model these data with 
conventional linear regression. Under model , the response vector  data is given by 
, where  is a vector of n ones,  is the intercept, is the centred 
design matrix, is a vector of regression coefficients, and  is a vector of normally 
distributed errors with precision (the inverse of variance) denoted . In the null model , 
the values are all zero.  and  are location/scale parameters common to both the null 
and alternative models.  
To calculate Bayes factors we must specify a prior distribution for the model 
parameters. Zellner (1986, as cited in Liang et al., 2008) suggested the following g prior: 
 (1) 
 (2) 
Equation 1 specifies an uninformative “Jeffreys prior” for the location/scale 
parameters (Jeffreys, 1961). Of more interest is the prior for the regression coefficients in 
Equation 2. Consider, for example, a model with a single covariate. From Equation 2, the 
prior probability distribution for the regression coefficient is normally distributed with 
variance g. Setting g to be small corresponds to prior belief that the regression coefficient is 
likely to take a small absolute value; setting g to be very large means a highly diffuse prior 
probability distribution for the regression coefficient, where large coefficients are judged 
similarly likely to small ones. Different suggestions have been offered regarding the choice 
of g. One simple option is to set g = n, the number of observations. With this “unit 
information” prior, the prior provides the same amount of information about the parameter as 
is provided by a single observation (Kass & Wasserman, 1995).  
One advantage of this approach is that we can write an analytic expression for the 
Bayes factor: 
   (3) 
Here is the unadjusted R-squared value from the regression model and is the 
number of regression coefficients for model . 
To compare nested models, one calculates the Bayes factors pitting each model 
against the null model with no covariates and then calculates the ratio of these Bayes Factors. 
For example, to compare a model that includes only additive effects of two predictors with 
one that includes an interaction term, one can calculate the Bayes factor as: 
  (4) 
With this formulation, values greater than 1 indicate that the data are more likely 
under the additive model than under the full model. For example, a Bayes factor of 3 means 
that the data are 3 times more likely under the model that assumes no interaction effect. To 
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calculate the Bayes factors with unit information priors in Table 7, we used the values 
from linear models with and without interaction terms to calculate the Bayes factors as per 
questions (3) and (4). Note that in the main text, we refer to the additive model that omits an 
interaction term as the “null hypothesis” and the full model that includes the interaction as the 
“alternative”, to emphasize our interest in presence or absence of an interaction.  
The unit information prior is convenient, but it has a number of drawbacks. For 
example, as tends to 1 and the evidence for the full model goes to infinity, the Bayes 
factor converges to an upper limit rather than tending to infinity – the so-called “information 
paradox” (Liang et al., 2008). Zellner and Siow (1980) suggested an alternative g prior which 
avoids some of these problems and which puts a multivariate Cauchy prior on the regression 
coefficients. Rather than taking a fixed value for the g parameter, the Zellner-Siow approach 
puts an Inverse-Gamma (1/2, n/2) prior on g. The Bayes factor is then: 
 (5) 
where 
  (6) 
To calculate the Bayes factors with Zellner-Siow priors in Table 7 of the main text, 
we numerically evaluated the integral in Equation 3 using the  values from models 
with/without interaction terms, and calculated
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